FoolWatch: A Case study of econometric analysis and evidenced-based-policy making in the Australian Government by Harding, Don
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
FoolWatch: A Case study of econometric
analysis and evidenced-based-policy
making in the Australian Government
Don Harding
School of Economics and Finance, La Trobe University, Australia
1. July 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16041/
MPRA Paper No. 16041, posted 5. July 2009 19:07 UTC
FoolWatch: A Case study of econometric
analysis and evidenced-based-policy making
in the Australian Government
Don Harding
Department of Economics and Finance La Trobe University
July 1, 2008
This paper is somewhat outside my usual elds of research (macroeconomics and
econometrics). I have been inuenced by Stilgoe, Irwin and Jones (2006) who provide
a useful discussion of evidence-based-policymaking in the UK. They provided links to
many sources of information quoted in this paper including the haunting and beautiful
sonet by Edna St Vincent Millay quoted in full on the on the next page of this paper.
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Sonnet X
Upon this age, that never speaks its mind,
This furtive age, this age endowed with power
To wake the moon with footsteps, t an oar
Into the rowlocks of the wind, and nd
What swims before his prow, what swirls behind 
Upon this gifted age, in its dark hour,
Falls from the sky a meteoric shower
Of facts . . . they lie unquestioned, uncombined.
Wisdom enough to leech us of our ill
Is daily spun; but there exists no loom
To weave it into fabric; undeled
Proceeds pure Science, and has her say; but still
Upon this world from the collective womb
Is spewed all day the red triumphant child.
Edna Saint Vincent Millay (1939)1.
1This sonnet was written to question the isolationist approach of US foreign policy
in light of the meteoric shower of factsabout Nazi Germany in the 1930s. It remains
relevant today because of its beauty and because Millay percieves the timeless nature of
the essential problems of science and evidence in shaping policy: there are facts enough
to to spin the treads of wisdom but often there exists no loom to weave those threads
into a fabric that is su¢ ciently undeled by self interest as to provide the insights that
shape good policy. Ultimately, the United States abondoned isolationism under FDRs
leadership. Perhaps, that experience and this beautiful sonnet can inspire modern leaders
to develop the loom needed to weave todays meteoric shower of facts into solutions to
todays problems.
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Abstract
The decision to introduce a national FuelWatch scheme provides a timely
case study of evidence-based- policymaking in Australia.
The government based its decision on econometric work by the ACCC
who refuse to release the data. They claim that their analysis is robust
because it has been subject to scrutiny within the ACCC and by Treasury.
Experience with evidence based policymaking in the United Kingdom
(UK) raises doubts about such claims. The UK experience led to the term
policy-based-evidenceto describe the end result where government agencies
ltered out information that was inconsistent with government policy.
The data used by the ACCC can be digitized from a graph in their report.
I then use the data so obtained to assess the robustness of the ACCC analysis
and econometrics. Since the government and their advisors did not realize
that the data could be obtained in this way it provides a natural experiment
in which their claims can be evaluated and tested.
I nd that the ACCC apply the wrong tests to the wrong variable. Specif-
ically, they study the nominal retail margin when economic theory suggests
that analysis of anything but the real retail margin to producers creates a
misspecied model inconsistent with the econometric assumptions used.
The econometrics in Appendix S of the ACCC report on petrol is substan-
dard in application of techniques and in reporting of what was done. This
should not be seen as an adverse reection on the econometricians employed
by the ACCC. Rather, it is a reection on the process through which their
work is incorporated into reports and used by government.
The ACCC ndings are not robust. When I apply the correct version of
the procedures used by the ACCC to the correct variable I nd that the data
does not support the original ACCC nding. Specically, it is not possible
to conclude as the ACCC did that FuelWatch did not raise petrol prices in
Western Australia.
FuelWatch of itself is unimportant. The important issues here relate to
the integrity of the governments evidence-basedapproach to policy. The
UK experience clearly shows that relying on the untested opinion of experts
leads to fudgingof the evidence or overstatement of the conclusions that
can be supported by the data. This ultimately corrupts the evidence-based-
policy approach. The FuelWatch experience shows that these dangers are
present for Australian policy makers. Greater transparency by government,
publication of data and analysis underpinning government decisions and in-
dependent review of econometric work are the only protections against this
danger. Failure to implement these protections will invalidate claims about
the evidence base of future policy decisions.
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1 Introduction
On 24 November 2007 the Australian people elected a new government that
promised to increase the extent to which evidence is used to inform its pol-
icy decisions.2 Six months into the new Governments term its decision
to introduce a national FuelWatch scheme provides a timely case study of
econometric evidence-based policymaking in the Rudd Labor government.
Background information on FuelWatch is provided in section 2
The Australian government and the ACCC claim that Appendix S of
the ACCC (2007) report on petrol pricing together with the ACCCs (2008)
supplementary material constitute evidence of the success of FuelWatch in
lowering petrol prices in Western Australia. In April 2008 the Australian
Government based its decision to introduce a national FuelWatch scheme on
the ACCC econometric analysis.
Section 3 shows how the data used by the ACCC in its econometric study
of FuelWatch can be extracted from a graph in the ACCC report something
that is entirely legal. The fact that I can obtain the data in this way con-
tributes to making this an ideal case study as one is not distracted by legal
issues as is often the case when information is leaked. Also the empirical
questions are simple. Did FuelWatch have any impact on retail prices in
Western Australia? And if so what was the direction and magnitude of that
e¤ect? The simplicity of these questions also makes the FuelWatch decision
ideal for a case study as attention can be focused on the issues associated
with evidence based policy making.
There are three main issues.
First, what is evidence? Most scientists would not view information
as being evidence until it was shown that the results could be replicated
independently - what this means in practice varies across the sciences but a
minimum requirement is that the data be public and the paper must have
been subject to independent public scrutiny. Often this scrutiny takes the
form of refereeing and publication in a journal. In courts of law information
is not regarded as evidence unless it is tested in court.
The government has claimed that the ACCC are the experts. At Senate
estimates the ACCC claimed that the econometric work was made su¢ -
2A preliminary draft of this paper was sent to appropriate government o¢ cials so that
they could comment and correct any errors. These included the Chief Executive O¢ cer of
the ACCC, Executive Director Markets Group Treasury and Deputy Secretary Domestic
Policy Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.
I am grateful to Dr Stephen King for a comment that helped me to clarify an important
issue. I am also grateful to Richard Hayes of the ACCC for his comments.
All responsibility for errors and omissions is mine alone.
4
ciently robust to be considered evidence because it was reviewed indepen-
dently by other ACCC sta¤ and by the Treasury.
The UKs experience with evidence-based-policyled to the term policy-
based-evidenceto describe the case where information released by govern-
ment was ltered to remove that which was inconsistent with government
policy. The UK experience summarised in Stilgoe, Irwin and Jones (2006)
suggests that it is unwise to characterise bureaucrats as expertsunless one
is really sure that the information is being supplied by the person who ac-
tually did the econometrics rather than by their manager or their managers
manager. The UK experience also suggests that internal review procedures
and even review by other government agencies have little value in protecting
against policy-based-evidence. The reason is that it is not in the career
interests of the bureaucrats to lean too heavily against the wind.
The UK experience provides a testable hypothesis. If the government and
ACCC are correct I should nd no signicant aws in the ACCC analysis
or econometrics. This hypothesis is tested in section 4 where the ACCCs
econometric analysis is evaluated against the standard of what is regarded as
good practice by experienced econometricians supervising honours and Ph.D.
students.
The second issue discussed briey in this paper is who are the experts?
Expert advice is essential in evidence-based-policy making. It follows that
the capacity to recognize who are the experts is essential to true evidence-
based-policy making. This issue is discussed in section 5.
The third issue is how can the experts be used to assist in implementing
evidence-based-policy rather than policy-based-evidence? I discuss this
issue in section 6 which discusses assembles information about evidence based
policy making in Australia and the United Kingdom.
Conclusions are presented in section 7.
2 Background to FuelWatch and the 2007 ACCC
report on petrol pricing
The national FuelWatch scheme which was announced on April 15 and is to
start on 15 December 2008 is based on the Western Australian governments
scheme of the same name.
2.1 Western Australian FuelWatch
On 2 January 2001 the Western Australian government introduced the Fuel-
Watch scheme. The key feature of this is the 24 hour rulewhich is explained
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as follows on the FuelWatch website
The 24-Hour Rule
Throughout most of WA fuel retailers are required to notify their
next days retail price for each fuel they sell by 2pm.
Retailers must stay at the notied price from 6am for 24 hours
this means WA motorists are free from the frustrating intra-day
price uctuations, which motorists in other Australian States still
experience.
Source: http://www.fuelwatch.wa.gov.au/about/dsp_how_fuelWatch_works.cfm
The FuelWatch scheme provides a website, telephone number and email
service that consumers can use to locate the cheapest price on a given day.
2.2 The 2007 ACCC report on petrol pricing
Petrol pricing has been a contentious issue in Australia and has been the
subject of a large number of inquiries. In many of these inquiries the ACCC
has voiced suspicion that the Western Australian FuelWatch scheme might
lead to increases in the average price of petrol. However, the ACCC did not
have access to su¢ cient data to test this hypothesis.
In late 2007 the ACCC delivered a report on Petrol pricing that was very
cautious about FuelWatch stating that3
Assessing any system in the style of FuelWatch that incorpo-
rates increased price information and price commitment requires
great care due to the potential for anti-competitive as well as
pro-competitive benets. Although the inquiry gained a prelim-
inary assessment of the impacts in Perth from the scheme, it is
clear that a caseby-case approach is required to assess the poten-
tial impacts on competition of any similar scheme. In particular
the ACCC has not analysed the application of such a scheme to
rural and regional areas. Apparent extra considerations here in-
clude the increased potential for anti-competitive e¤ects due to
the more concentrated nature of the market, the extra cost in
initialisation, administration and compliance and how to decide
which areas to cover. In summary, there are potential benets and
potential costs of adopting a national price commitment arrange-
ment that need to be carefully considered.
3ACCC, 2007, Petrol prices and Australian consumers report of the ACCC inquiry
into the price of unleaded petrol, 18th December 2007
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Appendix S of the ACCC report is an econometric analysis of the West-
ern Australian FuelWatch scheme. Changes to the relevant laws in 2006 and
at the end of 2007 provided the ACCC with new powers to subpoena doc-
uments, data and witnesses.4 The data used in this analysis was obtained
from Informed Sources using the ACCCs new subpoena powers. Mr. Graeme
Samuel, Chairman of the ACCC explained the propose of that econometric
work to the Senate Estimate inquiry
There has been an enormous focus on one particular half-page
of our report, the econometric analysis and appendix S of that
report. The econometric analysis which was described in appen-
dix S was undertaken with one purpose in mind, and that was
to determine whether or not FuelWatch had caused any harm to
Perth motorists since its introduction. It was designed to assess
whether FuelWatch had caused any increase in prices to Perth
motorists.
Source: Senate Committee Hansard, Standing Committee on
Economics, Estimates, Thursday 5 June 2008.
On 15 April the Australian Cabinet decided to implement a national
FuelWatch scheme. The press release announcing that decision said that5
Econometric analysis undertaken by the ACCC last year con-
cluded that under theWAFuelWatch scheme the relevant weekly
average price margin was around 1.9 cpl [cents per litre] less on
average.
Note the change in use of the econometric analysis. Initially the analysis
was designed to reassure the ACCC that Fuel watch was not causing WA
motorists to pay higher prices for petrol. Now the Government has trans-
formed its use to support a conclusion that FuelWatch had reduced the price
4Mr Samuel, Chairman of the ACCC observed that,
the powers that were conferred upon us by then federal Treasurer, Peter
Costello, powers of subpoena, powers of ability to obtain evidence from In-
formed Sources that had never been available to us before and powers to
obtain data that enabled us to undertake econometric modelling.
5The Prime Minister also observed that
"The National FuelWatch Scheme is a key part of the Rudd Governments
response to the ACCC report into the price of unleaded petrol."
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of petrol to WA motorists. This change in use is the rst evidence that we
have a case of policy-based-evidencerather than evidence-based-policy.6
On 29 April the ACCC released a document "Further FuelWatch econo-
metric analysis undertaken by ACCC". The conclusion of that document is
as follows:
The purpose of this econometric analysis has been to satisfy
the ACCC that the introduction of a FuelWatch scheme nation-
ally would not, based on the experience in Western Australia,
lead to consumers paying higher prices for petrol.
From the econometric analysis, on a conservative basis, the
ACCC can say that there is no evidence that the introduction of
FuelWatch in Western Australia led to any increase in prices and
it appears to have resulted in a small price decrease overall.
The ACCC conclusion up until the 12 words and it appears to have re-
sulted in a small price decrease overallare unexceptional. They represent a
competition authority doing its job by reassuring the public that the exten-
sion of a scheme that it had previously viewed as possibly anti-competitive
was unlikely to hurt consumers. The only issue that one could take with
this statement is that the econometric analysis released by the ACCC is not
su¢ ciently well explained to support the statement.
The last 12 words in the ACCC statement go well beyond the ACCCs
brief this and provide comfort to a government that was in political di¢ culty
over its decision to introduce a FuelWatch scheme. It is this part of the
ACCCs conclusion that supports the contention that it provided policy-
based-evidencerather than the reverse.
3 Reconstructing the FuelWatch data
Chart S1 on page 376 of the ACCC (2007) report shows the weekly price
margin used by the ACCC. Since the appendix is available electronically I
convert into a bitmap and import it into computer programs that can be
used to reconstruct the data.7 The two computer programs that I used are
discussed in Appendix A where I also explain how those programs were used.
6The term policy-based evidencecomes from the UKs experience with evidence-based
policyunder the Blair Labor government.
7This is an application of the work of the seventeenth century French philosopher Rene
Descartes who showed that graphs and equations are two di¤erent representations of the
same reality.
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3.1 The reconstructed data
The data extracted using Paint and Engauge Digitizer are shown in gure 1.
It is evident that the two series are so highly correlated that they cannot be
distinguished on the graph. This visual information suggests that the data
has been extracted with minimal measurement error.
Figure 1: Di¤erence between the nominal retail margin on petrol in Peth and
the eastern capital cities, reconstructed using Paint and Engauge Digitizer
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An important feature that is visible in gure 1 is that the margin seems
to be more volatile towards the end of the period than it is at the beginning
of the period. This feature will play an important role later in the paper.
Figure 2 shows an xy plot of the data where the data extracted using
Engauge Digitizer are shown on the x axis and the data extracted using Paint
are shown on the y axis. If there was no measurement error the data would
lie along a 45 degree line through the origin. The extent of any measurement
error is shown as deviations of the data from the 45 degree line through the
origin. The correlation between the two series is 0.99997 conrming that
the data lie almost on the 45 degree line. Clearly, the measurement error is
9
small.8
Figure 2: FuelWatch nominal retail margin reconstructed by two methods,
x,y plot.
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Given two series that are measures of the same concept, an improved
estimate that has lower measurement error variance can be constructed as
an average of the two series.9 This average is used as the dependent variable
in this paper.
There is, however, one caveat that needs to be made here about the
accuracy of the digitized data. The ACCC claims that their series runs from
1 August 1998 to 8 June 2007 a period of some 462 weeks whereas using both
methods I can only distinguish only 459 weeks of data in the chart. I am
reasonably condent that there is only 459 weeks of data in the Chart S1 of
8The average di¤erence between the two series is forteen thoudsandths of one cent with
a standard deviation of of twelve one thousandths of one cent. This latter quanity is an
estimate of the sum of the standard deviations of the measurement error in the two series.
9The extent of the reduction in measurement error achieved by averaging depends on
the actual standard deviations of the measurement error. If the standard deviations are
equal across the two series then the reduction in measurement error is about 29 per cent.
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the ACCC report and that the data starts at 1 August.10 But the ACCC
may have used di¤erent length of data in its econometric analysis. I doubt
whether this di¤erence a¤ects my results.11 But the ACCC can easily resolve
the issue by doing what it should have done in the rst place  release the
data.
4 The ACCCs econometric analysis
In assessing the quality of the ACCC econometrics it is useful to set out
objective criteria for determining good econometrics. I have chosen criteria
that can be extracted from instructions that Professor Kenneth D. West,
Ragnar Frisch Professor of Economics, at the University of Wisconsin gives
to his students when preparing an empirical research paper.12
The objective of your project should not be to calculate many
numbers, nor to perform a long series of tests, but rather to learn
something about some interesting parameter(s). The paper will
be evaluated with respect to clarity of exposition, thoroughness
of description of the data and methods, competence in using
the methods, and thoughtfulness in interpreting results. Com-
plexity of economic theory and econometric methods does not
carry weight in the evaluation. Appropriateness of the theory
and methods to the project does carry weight. So does good
writing.13
By way of background, low ranked academic journals, student essays
and increasingly the applied work of government agencies are chock full of
numbers and tests of every type. This approach might be labeled inoculation
econometrics as researchers who apply this kind of approach are attempting
to inoculate their work against criticism. However, in doing so the methods
used and tests applied are often inappropriate. West is advising his students
to avoid this approach as it rarely leads to understanding of the process
being investigated. What West suggests is that instead of the inoculation
10Chart S1 is poorly labeled as it does not report the period covered by the data.
11It could marginally a¤ect conclusions related to the timing of things.
12The course is for second year Phd students. Professor West teaches a similar course
for 4th year undergraduates that sets similar standards. Standards comparable to those
set by Professor West are set in the main Australian Economics Departments for work
in 4th year Honours theses and above. It seems reasonable to hold that the econometric
work of public agencies should meet these objective standards.
13Source: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~kwest/teaching/econ880/econ880%20syllabus.pdf
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approach his students should focus on an investigative approach to learn
something about some interesting parameter(s) 
4.1 The ACCC data
The ACCC constructed a series that represents the di¤erence between the
nominal retail margin on petrol in Perth
 
mPertht

and the nominal retail
margin on petrol in the eastern capital cities mEastt . The ACCC described
this data as follows
The data series was constructed using pricing information sup-
plied by Informed Sources and Platts. The series tested was
a measure of price margin that removes factors from the retail
price that are beyond the scope of FuelWatch to a¤ect, such as
net taxes, fuel quality premiums and ex-renery petrol prices.
ACCC report p375.
Details of how the di¤erence in the nominal price margin, which I denote
as mt, are calculated are provided on page 375 of the ACCC report and the
formulasare set out below.
mPertht = (Retail price-lagged Mogas95 price-net taxes - fuel quality premium)Perth
mEastt = (Retail price-lagged Mogas95 price-net taxes - fuel quality premium)Average of eastern cap ita ls
mt= m
Perth
t  mEastt
The ACCCs description of how the data is calculated is incomplete. The
following are a selection of issues that are not addressed in the ACCC report.
How are the averages calculated? Are they geometric or arithmetic
means? Are they weighted or unweighted?
What does the Mogas95 price represent? Specically, does it include
freight and freight related charges? Do such charges di¤er between the
States? Might any di¤erences in freight be accentuated by the increase in
energy prices.
How are the taxes and charges calculated? What taxes are included?
Have there been signicant variations in those taxes? If so were the variations
in taxes su¢ ciently large to have second round e¤ects on petrol demand and
thus petrol prices. Were these e¤ects similar or di¤erent across the states?
The new tax system was introduced in stages starting on 1 January 1999 and
proceeding through until 1 July 2001. These included, among other things,
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major cuts in income taxes that could have di¤erential e¤ects across states
if the income distribution di¤ers su¢ ciently across states. Similarly there
were major changes to capital gains taxes which could a¤ect petrol retail
margins if there are di¤erences across states in the intensity of land use in
petrol stations or if there are di¤erences in the expected capital gain on the
land component of service stations. These data issues are not addressed in
the ACCC appendix S.
4.2 Real versus nominal?
Nowhere in the ACCC appendix is it acknowledged that the price margins
used in the report are nominal price margin whereas the relevant body of
economic theory relates to real price margins.14 In the ACCC report the
margin between the eastern states and Western Australia is just labeled as
cents per litre. It is in fact a nominal margin so the unit of measurement
centshas a di¤erent purchasing power in every period. For later use I dene
the east-west di¤erence real margin to service station owners
 
rmPt

and to
consumers
 
rmCt

as follows
rmPt =
mt
P Ft
rmCt =
mt
PCt
Where P Ft is the price index for fuel in the CPI and P
C
t is the All groups
headline measure of the consumer price index. These data are available
quarterly so I interpolated the data using the formula
P it = P
i
t 1 
 
P iQ(t)
P iQ(t) 1
! 1
nQ(t)
; i = P;C
Where P iQ(t) is the quarterly measure of the price level for the quarter corre-
sponding to week t and nQ(t) is the number of weeks in the quarter.
14This feature of the ACCCs report falls short of best practice. For example, Professor
Ken Wests advice to students preparing an econometrics paper is
Be explicit about your data set. State the sample size. For time series, state
whether the data are monthly, quarterly or annual, and whether or not they
are seasonally adjusted. State the units of measurement. For example, if
income is a variable, state whether it is measured in current dollars or
constant 1992 dollars, and if it is per capita, say so.
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The exact method used to converting the margin into real terms will
matter empirically because the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose by 29 per
cent between August 1998 and June 2007 and the automotive fuel component
rose by 78 per cent. Figure 3 shows rmPt the real (ie adjusted by the price
index of automotive fuel) margin.
Figure 3: Di¤erence between Perth and average of eastern capital cities in
real retail margin to petrol station owners
 
rmPt

, August 1998 to June 2007
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FuelWatch starts here
Notice that rmPt does not have the feature exhibited in the nominal retail
margin (see Figure 1) that the variance seems to increase towards the end of
the period.
Figure 4 shows rmCt the real (ie adjusted by the CPI) margin. Notice
that there is some evidence that the variance in this series increases towards
the end of the time period. But this e¤ect is not as marked as it is in the
nominal margin (see Figure 1).
What does economic theory say about the properties of these three series?
Exit and entry of service stations is the economic process that can be expected
to stabilise the real producer margin so that it uctuates, without exhibiting
a time trend, about a constantthat reects the real retail margin at which
two conditions are met
 entry of an additional service station is not protable; and
 exit by one service station would make entry by another protable.
14
Figure 4: Di¤erence between Perth and average of eastern capital cities in
real retail margin to consumers
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I have put constantin inverted commas for three reasons. First, changes
in a variety of factors including the real interest rate, real (relative to petrol
prices) wages, and the real rental rates on land and capita will inuence
the real retail margin on petrol. Second the demand for petrol is heavily
inuenced by the calendar and this will cause the retail marginal to uctuate
with the calendar. The third reason is that if there is imperfect competition
then it is possible that the petrol stations set prices that uctuate through
coordination.
If the real retail margin to service stations is approximately constant
then the nominal margin should vary with the price of fuel P Ft . Specically,
the variance of the nominal margin should be proportional to the square of
P Ft : This feature makes the nominal margin (mt) unsuitable for economet-
ric analysis.15 A similar problem arises with rmCt as its variance will be
proportional to the square of P
F
t
PCt
:
Thus, the variable that is suitable for econometric analysis is the east-
west di¤erence in the real producer retail margin for petrol
 
rmPt

. Factors
such as interest rates and wage rates which are common between Perth and
15The essence of the problem is that PFt is almost certainly integrated of order one so
that the variance of the nominal margin will be an integrated process. One can see this
feature from a graph of the nominal margin.
15
the eastern capital cities should cancel out when this margin is calculated.
Thus rmPt should be determined primarily by the following factors
 di¤erences between Perth and the eastern capitals in calendar e¤ects;
 di¤erences between Perth and the eastern capitals in the e¤ects of the
new tax system that was introduced in 1999/2000; and
 the e¤ects of FuelWatch.
Once these factors are controlled for the residual should be comprised of
 Measurement error arising because the data was digitized;
 independent and identically distributed shocks that represent primarily
di¤erences between Perth and the eastern capitals in petrol demand
shocks
 a component that reects di¤erences between Perth and the eastern
capitals in any coordination of petrol stations in setting prices.
4.3 Appropriateness of theory and method
4.3.1 Model
The model specied below encompasses the two models used by the ACCC16
mt = ACCC + ACCCd1t + ACCCd2t + "ACCC;t (Model 1 (ACCC))
In responding to a draft of this paper an ACCC representative ques-
tioned whether model 1 is an accurate representation of the work of the.
The argument put by the ACCC o¢ cer is that the analysis in Appendix
S related a single structural break while Model 1 above has two structural
breaks. This argumentis incorrect for two main reasons. First, while the
model in Appendix S did only have one structural break the document Fur-
ther Econometric Analysis Undertaken by ACCC did contain a model with
two structural breaks. Thus model one above encompasses these two cases
and is an accurate characterisation of the ACCC model. Second, the single
break case is easily obtained in from model 1 by setting ACCC = 0: This
16The two models I refer to are the one structural break model in Appendix S of the
ACCC report and the two structural break model on the last page of the document Petrol
 Further Econometric Analysis Undertaken by ACCC that was released on 29 May 2008.
16
is a restriction that can be tested and one will nd that when d1t breaks in
early May 2000 the restriction ACCC = 0 is strongly rejected. Indeed from
Table 1 one can see that the HACC robust t-statistic is  4:2. Another way
of looking at this is that the single break model in Appendix S is not robust
to the addition of an additional variable viz d1t:
There is also an important logical reason for including the second struc-
tural break  the ACCC report relies on a form of logic which says after
this therefore because of this. Thats how they can relate the shift in mean
after the introduction of FuelWatch to FuelWatch. This form of logic is re-
garded with considerable suspicion in the sciences. A simple example will
show why. Since Christmas cards always arrive before Christmas, this form
of logic would say that Christmas cards cause Christmas. The fundamental
problem here is that there is an omitted variable expectation of Christmas.
Addition of a variable that measures expectation of Christmaswill solve the
problem as after adding this variable one will no longer nd that Christmas
cards cause Christmas. This simple example shows how econometricians ad-
dress their concerns about the after this therefore because of thislogic 
they add further variables and see whether that changes the ndings. Thats
what I have done here.
In model 1, the model used by the ACCC, the nominal petrol retail
margin mt is the variable to be explained. But as discussed in the preceding
section this specication is invalid and results in the variance of "ACCC;t being
proportional to to the square of P Ft something that precludes using regression
analysis. A sensible modication is to replace the dependent variable with
rmPt which leads to model 2.
17 ; 18
rmPt = P + Pd1t + Pd2t + "P;t (Model 2)
In model 2, rmPt is explained by our factors. The rst of these is a constant
(ACCC) : The second and third factors are shift variables d1t and d2t:19 The
17One might ask why the margin is not set in constant real terms to the consumer. The
reason suggested by economic theory is this. If petrol stations set the margin in this way
then when the petrol price was increasing by more than the CPI they would go broke and
when the petrol price was increasing by less than the CPI they would be earning excess
prots that encouraged entry of new service stations thereby driving the margin down
18In this paper I have not sought to remove calendar e¤ects because the ACCC did
not do so and my objective is to replicate the ACCC work using the correct dependent
variable. Omiting calendar e¤ects will not bias the conclusions unless they are correlated
with the introduction of FuelWatch something that seems unlikely. Incorporating calendar
e¤ects would, however, contribute to improving the e¢ ciency of estimators.
19d1t takes the value 0 until week t1   1 and it takes the value 1 from week t1 through
to week t2   1.
d2t takes the value 0 until week t2   1 and it takes the value 1 from week t2 through to
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coe¢ cients ACCC and ACCC measure the extent to which the mean nominal
retail margin for petrol is changed after dates t1 and t2 respectively. It is
important to note that in this specication the ACCC are implicitly assuming
that there are no other deterministic facts such as the calendar that explain
the petrol prices. The fourth factor is the residual "ACCC;t which represents
the part of the margin that is explained by stochastic factors other than the
constant and the two shift variables. The residual has unconditional mean of
zero but may exhibit signicant serial dependence. The unit of measurement
for the coe¢ cients is cents per litre at fuel prices prevailing in the week
starting 25 August 1998 - a real quantity. The residual "P;t is also expressed
in real terms.
4.3.2 Seasonal adjustment and calendar e¤ects
Decisions about when people drive, how far they drive and the timing of their
proximity to service stations are all a¤ected by the calendar and by events
such as public holidays and school holidays that are related to the calendar.
Thus, demand for petrol shifts with the calendar causing the price of petrol
moves with the calendar. To the extent that retail petrol prices are set above
marginal cost through (imperfect competition) retail margins will also vary
with the calendar.
The data supplied to the ACCC by Informed Sources was raw data that
measures the di¤erence between petrol retail margins in Perth and the eastern
capital cities of Australia. This data will exhibit calendar e¤ects unless the
calendar e¤ects on retail margins in Perth are exactly the same as those in
the eastern capital cities something that is unlikely to be true. Thus it is
important to check whether calendar variation is evident in the data. This
is more tricky with weekly data than with monthly or quarterly data as the
number of weeks in a year varies from 52 to 53 whereas the number of months
and quarters in a year is constant across years. The simplest way of checking
for seasonal e¤ects is to construct a variable st that measures the proportion
of a year that has elapsed (proportion of days to 31 December). A simple
regression of rmPt on st and constant returns a coe¢ cient of -2.24 with robust
t-statistic of -2.6 which allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no calendar
e¤ects.20
the end of sample.
20In commenting on a draft of this paper an ACCC o¢ cer questioned whether the test
for calendar e¤ects is useful and suggested replacing the variable st with weekly dummy
variables. One can certainly do this but it is not the most e¤ective way of dealing with this
issue. I have experimented with alternative methods and I am satised that the statement
made in the paper about calendar e¤ects is a conservative one. I am also convinced
on the basis of that experimentation that allowing for those calendar e¤ects in a more
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The ACCC makes no allowance for calendar e¤ects in their modelling
however as mentioned earlier this misspecication will mainly a¤ect the e¢ -
ciency of the estimator.
In commenting on a draft of this paper an ACCC o¢ cer questioned
whether the test for calendar e¤ects is useful and suggested replacing the
variable st with weekly dummy variables. One can certainly do this but it
is not the most e¤ective way of dealing with this issue. I have experimented
with alternative methods and I am satised that the statement made in the
paper about calendar e¤ects is a conservative one. I am also convinced on
the basis of that experimentation that allowing for those calendar e¤ects in
a more sophisticated way will not recover the orginal ACCC conclusion. In-
deed, in these experiments I found that the data gives even less support to
the ACCC conclusion.21
4.3.3 Testing for stationarity
In essence a data generating process is stationary if the moments do not
change over time.22 Much econometric work focuses on the rst two moments:
the mean and the variance. One can think of non-stationarity as arising when
these moments are functions of time. Two types of non-stationarity are
potentially present in the FuelWatch data. The rst of these are structural
breaks in the mean. These could arise for example if
1. Changes in tax policy had di¤erent e¤ects on petrol station margins in
Western Australia to Eastern Australia. Importantly, the tax systems
was changed extensively through the period 1999 to 2001 with major
changes being made in mid 2000.
2. New entrants to the industry such as Coles caused a reduction in the
margin obtained by Western Australian service stations;
3. The FuelWatch scheme had its intended e¤ect to reduce service station
margins.
sophisticated way will not recover the orginal ACCC conclusion. Indeed, it suggests that
the data gives even less support to the ACCC conclusion.
21I have not included this additional material because the paper is already technical and
making it more technical would make it less accessible to a broad audience.
22This statement assumes a) that moments are nite; and b) that the probability dis-
tribution of the data is determined completely by the moments. A more precise, but
less readable, statement can be applied to the more general case where neither of the
assumptions hold.
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The second form of non stationarity arises where the variance of a series
is a function of time. This arises in two main way. The rst is if the data
is a deterministic function of time so that rmPt   dt is stationary where dt
is deterministic function of time. Because of the e¤ect of the calendar on
petrol demand this is an entirely plausible specication.
The second way that the variance of rmPt could be a function of time arises
where rmPt   dt can be written as the cumulation of a stationary series.23 In
this case the series can be written as24

 
rmPt   dt

= 
 
rmPt 1   dt 1

+
qX
i=1
i
 
rmPt 1   dt i

+ t (1)
Where  is the parameter of interest. If  = 0 this means that the series
rmPt has a unit root and the variance of rm
P
t will have a time trend.
This is a specication that is often found in macroeconomics but we
should question its plausibility for this data. If  = 0 it means that the
variance of
 
rmPt   dt

is proportional to time. So that at June 30 2007 the
variance of
 
rmPt   dt

would be 459 times as high as in the week beginning
1 August 1998 something that does not seem consistent with free entry into
and exit from petrol retailing.
There are a number of technical deciencies in the ACCC testing for unit
roots. These are discussed in appendix B where I show that if one corrects
these technical deciencies then the test applied by the ACCC would actually
nd that the east-west di¤erence in the nominal margin (mt) has a unit root
as is suggested by the theory. However, this nding is moot as the ACCC
applied the wrong test, incorrectly to the wrong series.
One error that is so striking that it requires some discussion is the fact
that the ACCC, in a paper exploring possible structural breaks, used a test
that is valid only where there are no structural breaks. An augmented Dickey-
Fuller test allowing for two known structural breaks can be conducted via
the ADF regression (1) where the deterministic component is
dt = 0 + 1d1t + 2d2t
I applied this test to rmPt which is the correct variable. Critical values
for the ADF test with two known structural breaks can be obtained via
simulation. For series with 459 observations the 1%, 5% and 10% critical
values are  4:08,  3:44 and  3:12 respectively. A lag length of 4 weeks was
23Strictly speaking the stationary series must also have positive spectral density at
frequency zero.
24 is the di¤erence operator. So xt = xt   xt 1:
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the smallest that produced a reasonably at spectrum for rmPt . With q = 4
and two structural breaks allowed for the ADF test statistic is  6:82 leading
to a rejection of the null hypothesis of stationarity. So we can conclude that
once structural breaks in the mean are allowed for the real producer retail
margin on petrol is integrated of order zero as is suggested by economic
theory.
4.3.4 Thoroughness of description of methods
As discussed above and in appendix B, ACCC Appendix S leaves out much
of the information that is necessary to judge whether the unit root testing
has been applied correctly. A similar problem arises with the Newey West
standard errors that are reported in Table S2. The ACCC recognize that
serial correlation is present in the data and seek to correct that using Newey
West standard errors. There are two issues here,
1. The key parameter in calculating the Newey West standard errors is
the window width used in the calculation. The ACCC does not tell us
what window width was used or how it was determined. This departs
from best practice in this area.
2. The ACCC does not provide diagnostics that might help us understand
how important is the problem of serial dependence in the data.
The ACCC report says that they searched for endogenous structural
breaks. However, no information is provided on how this search was con-
ducted. As search that attempted to minimize the sum of squared errors in
Model 1 would be incorrect as it would not allow for the presence of serial
correlation in those errors.
4.3.5 Estimating the e¤ect of FuelWatch for known break dates
Here I replicate the ACCC analysis using the correct dependent variable 
rmPt

: I assume that there are two break dates one in the rst week of May
2000 . The other in the rst week of January 2001 reecting the introduction
of FuelWatch in WA. The estimates, robust standard errors25 and robust
condence intervals are reported in Table 1.
25The standard errors are calculated making use of the fact that the regres-
sors are deterministic. So that the covariance matrix for the estimators is
(X 0X) 1X 0
X (X 0X) 1where 
ij = E"P;i"P;j : Consistent estimators of the rst q au-
tocovariances were used to construct b
 resulting in a feasible and consistent estimate of
the covariance matrix using a q = 17. The covariance matrix hardly changes for values
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Table 1: Estimated coe¢ cients of Model 2
Coe¢ cient Estimate Robust
Standard Error 95% Condence Interval
P 1:23 0:22 (0:79; 1:67)
P  1:68 0:40 ( 2:48; 0:88)
P (FuelWatch)  0:29 0:36 ( 1:01; 0:43)
Since the robust 95% condence interval includes zero it is not possible,
based on this data, to say as the ACCC did that the WA FuelWatch scheme
did not act to increase the real retail margin for petrol in Perth. The mean
estimated e¤ect is for a reduction of 0:29 1 August 1998 cents which translates
into about 0:52 of a cent in mid 2008.
One possibility is that the estimated e¤ects of FuelWatch are biased down-
wards because although the scheme came into e¤ect on 2 January 2001 it may
not have had an e¤ect until some weeks later. To check this I allowed the in-
troduction of the FuelWatch to vary from 13 January 2001 to 3 March 2001.
The resulting estimates for the FuelWatch coe¢ cient
bP are  0:24,  0; 21,
 0:18,  0:14.  0:14,  0:14 and  0:16: These gures suggest that  0:29 of
a cent per litre is the maximum reduction in the real margin generated by
the FuelWatch scheme.
The analysis above does not allow for calendar e¤ects or for additional
structural breaks nor does it make the location of the structural breaks en-
dogenous. My assessment is that such extensions to the analysis would serve
to cast further doubt on the ACCC conclusion that FuelWatch did not act
to increase the real retail margin for petrol in Western Australia.
4.3.6 Overall assessment
The approach of the ACCC does not stand up well against the criteria set
out at the beginning of this section. Specically,
1. The ACCC uses the wrong dependent variable (the east-west di¤er-
ence in the nominal retail margin for petrol) rather than the east-west
di¤erence in the real producer retail margin for petrol.
2. Use of the wrong variable results in more than misspecication because
it means that the assumption of stationarity necessary for the econo-
metrics cannot hold.
of q between 10 and 100. Similar standard errors are obtained using the Newey West
procedure.
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3. The ACCC procedures cannot detect such non stationarity because
they apply the wrong test to the wrong variable. Moreover, their ap-
plication of the test is awed because the seem to use an incorrect lag
length.
4. The ACCC approach is one in which it has sought to use tests to in-
oculateitself against criticism rather than trying to "learn something
about some interesting parameter(s)". This is the source of many of
the econometric aws in the ACCC analysis.
5. The reporting of the ACCC econometrics is substandard.
6. When I redo the ACCC analysis using the correct dependent variable
and allowing for two structural breaks the data does not support the
ACCC conclusion that the FuelWatch scheme did not lead to increased
petrol prices in Perth.
That said Appendix S of the ACCC report provides a thoughtful discus-
sion of the caveats to their work. However, some important caveats such as
the issue of nominal versus real margin and the possible e¤ects of the tax
system introduced in 1999-2001 are neglected.
A natural but incorrect response is to blame the econometricians who
undertook this work. The public service has many very able econometricians
and economists and I draw no adverse conclusion about those who undertook
this work or those who reviewed it. Econometrics is a di¢ cult art. The qual-
ity of econometric work is almost always improved by public scrutiny and
particularly by seminars and workshops involving academics. By the same
token the quality of econometric work is almost always reduced by factors
such as secrecy, the issues being politicised, ambitious junior ministers seek-
ing to make a name for themselves and when the evil trioof the managers
manager, lawyers and econometric guns for hireare involved.
5 Who are the experts?
Stilgoe Irwin and Jones (2006) observe that
The physicist Werner Heisenberg dened an expert as someone
who knows some of the worst mistakes that can be made in their
subject and who manages to avoid them. Expert wisdom is about
navigating uncertainty, reminding people in power what we still
might not know, in addition to what we think we know, and
cautioning against complacency.
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This is a reasonable starting point for discussion but Heisenberg has de-
ned someone who has expertise rather than someone who is has su¢ cient
knowledge of the particular issue as to be regarded as an expert.
For econometric analysis the expert is the person who actually undertook
the econometrics and thus will have an intimate knowledge of the data and
the methods used. Such a person should also have an appreciation of the
qualications to the analysis, the mistakes that can be made and what was
done to make the analysis robust to these potential qualications. Whether
the person actually has the knowledge described can only be discovered by
asking them. It is rare to see such people give evidence at public inquiries
because they are typically very junior in the bureaucratic hierarchy. They
are, however, experts on the particular matter.
The second category of expert is the manager who supervised the per-
son(s) who performed the econometrics. Such people are experts because
they know the procedures and protocols that were used to ensure that the
econometrics were undertaken according to best practice. It is also relatively
rare for such people to appear at public inquiries.
The third category is the managers manager. Such people may or may
not have expertise as dened by Heisenberg but they denitely are not experts
because they have little direct knowledge of what was done or how what was
done was supervised. It is usually the managers manager or some person
even further removed from direct experience with what was done who gives
the evidence at bureaucratic inquiries. Because they are so removed from
what was done the testimony of such people is largely useless in evaluating
whether the process under study was capable of turning information into
robust and tested evidence.
The ACCCs econometric work was discussed in the Senate estimates
economic committee on 5 June 2008 which heard evidence from a number
of o¢ cials including the ACCC Chairman, the Commissioners who were re-
sponsible for the ACCC report and senior Treasury o¢ cials. An interesting
question that is as yet unresolved is whether any of these o¢ cials that ap-
peared before the Senate Committee as experts actually did the econometrics
for appendix S of the ACCC report. A related question is whether any of
these o¢ cials was the immediate manager of the person(s) who did the cal-
culations. If the answer to these questions turns out to be no then these
o¢ cials may or may not have expertise but they cannot be said to be experts
in the econometric analysis of FuelWatch.
There is a fourth category of people with expertise that needs mentioning
- academics. Academics were excluded from the process because the ACCC
refused to release the data used in its report. In evidence to the ACCC Mr.
Samuel e¤ectively dismissed academics as a public nuisance stating that:
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I am not in a position to be able to say that we would make our
data and our methodology available to anyone out in the public
arena. We are not prepared to make all this available for any
economic modeller or any economic student to simply go through
and then to engage the already heavily worked sta¤ of the ACCC
in debate on these issues. The commission of inquiry needed to
satisfy itself that the work that was done was robust and they
have done just that.
In essence Mr. Samuel is saying that the ACCC sta¤ who defend ordi-
nary Australians against anti-competitive behaviour by business need to be
protected from competition in ideas and analysis that is provided by scrutiny
from academics, students, journalists and the general public.26 It is evident
from the previous section that the ACCCs would benet from greater expo-
sure to academic econometricians. It is also evident that public policy would
benet from such scrutiny.
6 Reections on evidence-based policy mak-
ing in Australia
Shortly after winning the 2008 election the new Prime Minister rea¢ rmed
his commitment to evidence based policy making:.
I believe in evidence-based policy not just sort of grand state-
ments. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, 7.30 Report 27/11/2007
26Mr Samuel also said that
.... if there is an economic consulting rm that wants to do its own analysis of
the impact of FuelWatch in Perth then they can approach Informed Sources.
Not that it is our right to do so anyhow, but we have said to Informed
Sources, You are absolutely free to make whatever data you want available
to whomever you want on whatever terms and conditions you want to make
it, so they are entitled to do their own research and use whatever test they
want to use and whatever methodology they want to use.
This statement is disingenuous as the ACCC had to supoena the data from Informed
Sources who are unlikely to make the data publically available. Professor Joshua Gans
states on his Blog
I can now conrm that Informed Sources is unable to provide the same
data the ACCC had access to, to third parties such as academics. Source:
http://economics.com.au/?p=1439
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Implicit in the new Prime Ministers statement is the assertion that previ-
ous Australian governments were somehow decient in not making adequate
use of evidence in policy making. This claim is not true - even before fed-
eration state governments were making extensive use of evidence in decision
making. For example, Sir Timothy Coglan the New South Wales Statisti-
cian between 1886 and 1904 developed a macroeconomic data collection that
is similar to national accounts; See Haig (2006). Haig observes that in the
late 1920s Brigden, Giblin and others were using Coghlans quantitative
approach in a study of the. e¤ects of the Australian tari¤". In the Har-
vester Case in 1907, Justice Henry Bournes Higgins set out to use empirical
evidence to determine what constituted fair and reasonablewages.
The Campbell Committee of inquiry nal report was delivered on No-
vember 1981 assembled a vast body of evidence on the nancial system and
the need the for change. The Hawke Labor government that implemented
the ndings of this report was arguably the pinnacle of evidence-based de-
cision making in Australia. But even the Hawke Labor government experi-
enced problems with the evidence-based approach. Most notably it found
the work of the Bureau of Labour Market Research politically unpalatable
and scrapped that body.
Experience suggests that several issues arise with the evidence-based ap-
proach.
First, public policy decisions create winners and losers who have consid-
erable incentives to distort the evidence or its interpretation. These winners
and losers may be commercial interests who have nancial incentives to pay
considerable sums of money to inuence or shape expertopinion. The bat-
tle of expertsthat ensues rarely sheds light on how the public interest can
be furthered.
Political interests also have strong incentives to inuence or shape expert
opinion so as to achieve a political agenda. Ambitious junior ministers, for
example, have a strong incentive to achieve quick resultsthereby enhancing
their promotion prospects. As Stilgoe, Irwin and Jones (2006) observe it
is very di¢ cult for bureaucrats to lean against the wind created by the
ambition of a minister. In the FuelWatch case there is a cadre of well trained
public servants in Treasury, Finance, PrimeMinister and Cabinet, ACCC and
the various energy, resource and industry departments who have su¢ cient
econometric expertise to see through the aws in the ACCCs published
work. Indeed the leaked departmental coordinating comments suggests that
at least four departments applied their econometric expertise to reach the
correct conclusion. So the problem was not one of knowledge or training it
was one of incentives. Any bureaucrat who stood up to point out the errors
in the ACCC report would be doing more than leaning against the wind.
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In standing up to a new government that may be in o¢ ce for two or more
terms they would be making what is known as a career limiting move.
Second, after having made a decision for narrow political purposes gov-
ernments have a strong incentive to dress that decision upin the clothes
of respectability by selectively using facts that support the decision. This is
clearly what happened when the ACCC appendix was converted from saying
that there was no evidence that FuelWatch increased petrol prices to the
additional document which said that it may have lowered petrol prices
The problem is that once a government engages in such practices it be-
comes di¢ cult for voters to distinguish between true evidence-based policy
making and the sham that is policy-based evidence. The result is a general
loss of faith in government and in its claims to base decisions on evidence.
Such nancial and political incentives make the realpolitikof evidence-
based-policy making much more di¢ cult than it might seem. Some of the
problems experienced in the United Kingdom with evidence-based-policy are
summarized in the following paragraph from Stilgoe, Irwin and Jones (2006)
In November 2006, a report from the Commons Select Com-
mittee on Science held a mirror to the fashion for evidence-based
policy. In some areas, the committee argued, evidence-based
has become a way to justify policy rather than a way to make
policy the evidence is found to suit the decision. Evan Harris,
a committee member and Liberal Democrat science spokesman,
said that the way some policies claimed to be evidence-based was
a fraud which corrupts the whole use of science in government.
Commitment to evidence-based-policy has a natural attraction to vot-
ers it conveys the hope that public policy decisions can be objective, rational
and informed by careful quantication of the evidence. But some government
decisions have to be made on the basis of ideology, convenience or whim be-
cause the evidence is inconclusive. The problem with the unqualied mantra
of evidence-based-decisionmaking is that it creates a false hope that gov-
ernments and their advisors cannot possibly meet. When they are inevitably
seen to fail in reaching this goal governments run the risk of damaging their
credibility and that of the evidence based approach.
Based on the preceding analysis I conclude that if the Australian govern-
ment is serious about evidence-based-policymaking it should:
1. Adopt the standard that it will not claim that a decision is evidence-
based unless:
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(a) It releases the data and analysis on which that decision was based;
and
(b) It has subjected the analysis to truly independent review.
2. Heed the lesson in the fact that the advice from his department that the
Treasurer dismissed as too academicproved ultimately to be correct;
3. Recognize that Cabinet coordinating comments which are often partly
anonymous serve both to protect a government against error and also
partly protect bureaucrats who provide accurate but unpalatable ad-
vice.
4. Recognize that some decisions cannot be evidence-based because there
is insu¢ cient evidence on which to base a decision or the evidence is
inconclusive. In these cases fudgingthe evidence or overstating what
conclusion the evidence supports acts to corrode and corrupt the use
of evidence in shaping policy; and
5. Recognize that academics provide an invaluable resource capable of the
independent reviews necessary to catch cases of policy-based-evidence.
Providing such academics with access to resources and the data is fun-
damental to implementing evidence-based-policy making.
7 Conclusion
Experience shows that good decisions are based on evidence that is tested.
The ACCC econometric evidenceused to justify the FuelWatch decision
was not adequately tested or evaluated. The actual econometrics was deeply
awed. When the econometrics is redone the ACCC conclusion can no longer
be supported.
This case study replicates the UK experience where it was found that
expertanalysis was often misleading unless it was made robust by being
exposed to public scrutiny and scientic analysis. For econometric analysis
the key criteria is that the data is publicly available and clearly described
so that the analysis can be replicated and extended if it is found to be un-
satisfactory or incomplete. Until the government modies its procedures
to reect this experience it cannot legitimately claim that its decisions are
evidence based.
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Appendices
A Programs used to digitize the FuelWatch
data in Chart S1
Two computer programs, Paint and Engauge Digitizer, were used and the
extracted data compared to check for errors. Both methods are described
below.
A.1 Paint
Paint is found on most personal computers and has several important prop-
erties that are useful in manually extracting data:
 when one clicks on the line icon the screen pointer turns into cross
hairs;
 It is possible to place a one-pixel width grid over the graph.
 the resolution can be magnied up to 8 times so as to help resolve
di¢ cult cases.
For most cases a magnication of 2 times was su¢ cient.
 by placing the cross hairs over a point it is possible to read the location
in xy plane of each point on a graph.
The features outlined above mean that by placing the cross hairs:
 at the edges of the axis it is possible to read the scale of the graph in
pixels; and
 on each data point it is possible to read the (x; y) coordinates in pixels.
A simple linear equation converts the data expressed in pixels back into
the price margin expressed in cents per litre of petrol.
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A.2 Engauge Digitizer
Engauge Digitizer is shareware that allows users to digitize graphs.27 To use
digitizer one simply,
 imports the graph;
 places the cross hairs of the pointer over the maximum and minimum
values of the x and y axis and click the mouse to record the location of
the axes.
 for each data point, place the cross hairs over the data point and click
the mouse to record the (x; y) coordinates on the graph;28
 if an error is made it can be easily corrected; and
 the data can be copied onto the computers clipboard and then pasted
into a spreadsheet.
_____________________________________
The two programs provide independent ways of extracting the data from
a graph. For this reason the error made with one program should not be
correlated with the error made from the other program.
27Available at http://digitizer.sourceforge.net/.
28Engauge Digitizer can also be used in automatic mode where it is "trained" to identify
certain datapoints and then extract the data automatically. This feature was tried but
did not produce results as accurate as those from the manual location of datapoints.
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B Technical aspects of the ACCC stationar-
ity tests
The ACCC tested for the presence of a unit root using the regression (1).
This involve choosing the deterministic component dtand an integer q to
represent the number of lags. The choices made by the ACCC were
1. To assume that dt is a constant and there is no structural break;
2. To set the maximum q according to the formula qmax = Int
h
12    T
100
0:25i
:
Where Int [a] refers to the integer part of the number a. In this case
qmax = 17:
3. To chose q by a sequential t-test starting at q_max and using a signif-
icance level of 10-percent. Unfortunately the ACCC does not say what
the actual value of q was chosen. Nor do they say in which direction
the sequential testing was run: one can either start from p = 0 and
stop when the t-statistic on the longest lag is insignicant at the 10
per cent level  called the bottom upapproach. Or one can start at
p = pmax and keep reducing p by one until the t-statistic on the longest
lag is signicant at the 10 per cent level  often called the tops down
approach. The later approach when used with the particular t-test can
be shown to overestimate the number of lags something that produces
ine¢ ciency.29 The former approach of starting at p = 0 runs the risk
of selecting p that is too small and thus not controlling adequately for
serial dependence. The result of using the bottom upapproach is a
test that is invalid.
The so called augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test then gathers statistical
evidence gathered as to whether  = 0 or  < 1:
When I repeat the exercise as described by the ACCC I only nd that
I can reject the null hypothesis (using a 10 per cent signicance level) if I
use the invalid bottoms up approach to selecting q. If I do this I nd thatbq = 5 and  =  0:163 with standard error 0:043 so the ADF t-statistic is
 3:8 which would lead to rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root.
For the reason given above one might suspect that q was chosen too small
and thus there remains unaccounted serial dependence in the residuals from
the ADF regression. One can check this by inspecting the spectrum of the
29Using a t-test with 10 per cent signicant level is approximately the same as using the
Akaikie information criteria.
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residuals which is shown in Figure below together with condence bands.
If there were su¢ cient lags in the ADF regression (and the deterministic
component was correctly specied) then the spectrum would be at. As
can be seen from Figure this is not the case conrming that the bottoms
up approach yields too small an value of q to adequately purge the serial
correlation from the residuals of the ADF regression.
Figure 5: Spectrum of residual from ADF regression for nominal retail margin
on petrol when q = 5
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The procedure outlined above of using some model selection criteria to
chose q is frequently observed in the literature. But this approach confuses
parsimony (choice of a small q) with selection of the smallest q that is consis-
tent with a at spectrum. It is the latter feature that is necessary to ensure
that the statistical tests under which the ADF test is valid are met. For the
reason just stated I will use the at spectrumcriteria to inform my choice
of q.
Starting from qmax = 17 one nds that the spectrum of the ADF residuals
is atuntil q = 12 so this suggests using q = 13 weeks (the smallest value of
q that yields a at spectrum). With this choice of qthe ADF statistic is  2:1
and since this is greater than the critical value of  2:57 we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the nominal margin contains a unit root. Clearly this
is at odds with the ACCC nding and suggests that the nominal margin mt
contains a unit root as would be expected if Model 2 is the true model and
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P Ft contains a unit root. The existence of a unit root in mt is consistent with
the visual in evidence in Figures 1 and 4 which suggests that the volatility
of the series is increasing over time. The leading hypothesis about the cause
of this increasing volatility is that Model 2 is indeed the true model.
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